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Industry 
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We construct a model of three firms oligopoly with homo-
geneous goods and portray situations where firms fail to merge 
into monopoly. although such a merger maximizes aggregate 
profits. The degree of technological asymmetry and the effects of 
externalities determine the outcome via their effects on the 
profitability of a bilateral merge:r. There are situations when an 
ineffìcient firm. that cannot survive in a Cournot competi디on. 
obtains a positive payoff in the gr없1d coalition. There are also 
cases when the efficient firm has a clisadvantage to bargain. 
Keyωords: Externality. Technological asymmetry. Bilateral 
merger. Grand coali 디on. Bargaining. 
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I. Introduction 
Merger and acquisition are common in business place. If we turn 
the business pages of the daily newspapers and business 
magazines. we can notice that everyday some firms are merging 
with some other firms. and some firms are nego디ating for merger. 
S디11 sometimes firms fail to merge. Different characteristics and 
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business strategies may prevent them from merging. Of course. 
antitrust laws might prohibit horizont허 merger. Then. if one 
assumes that antitrust laws are not applicable. at least to some 
oligopoly industries of our interest. one may then presume that 
oligop이ists. producing homogenous goods. should always merge to 
avoid compe디tion and prevent dissipation of profits. The nature of 
product market compe디디on determines non-coopera디ve payoffs of 
the players. Since the monopoly payoff strictly dominates the 
oligopoly industry payoff. one may tempt to conclude 단lat a grand 
merger (i. e.. a single coalition of all firms) should always take 
place. because firms can now share a larger profit. This paper 
examines this hypothesis and proves the inv려idity of the statement. 
Even in a homogeneous good industrγ. firms may not successfully 
come up with forming a grand coalition. Therefore. the absence of 
any antitrust rules does not necessarily mean perfect or complete 
monopolization of the industry. The reason is that firms may fail to 
agree on a division of pie. In our paper this occurs when firms 
have asymmetric technologies and merger of a sub-group of firms 
creates externalities. In such a situation firms mi방11 find it even 
more profitable to stand outside the merger. In particular. 
extemalities under merger occur when the product market is 
characterized by Coumot type competition. We show that when the 
effects of externalities are large enough because of some 
technological asymmetry. firms under quantity competition may fail 
to agree on a grand merger. 
We construct a model of three firms. Hence. to the ques디on of 
all firms merger. it is necessary that we discuss 밍ld understand 
the possibility of a bilateral merger in this context. F이lowing the 
analysis of Salant. Switzer. and Reynolds (SSR) (1 983). we know 
that when the firms hold identical and constant returns to scale 
technology. a bilateral merger is never feasible. 1 This is due to the 
pecuniary extemality. as identified in the SSR paper. So. one 
purpose of the present paper is also to examine under what 
conditions cost asymmetries may overcome this pecuniary exter 
nality of Coumot competi디on. 2 
lSee also Levin (1990) and Fauli-Oller (1 997) 
2perry and Porter (1985) have shown that if merger is associated wi야1 
some efficiency gain in the form of cost reduction. then merger of any size 
can be profitable. Farrell 밍ld Shapiro (199이 have extended the model to 
welfare analysis. Kabiraj and Chaudhuri (1999) have discussed the choice 
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We consider a coopera디ve model of coalition formation. and 
assume that firms have complete information about their own and 
rivals ’ strategies and payoffs under éùl possible con디ngencies. So , in 
the negotiation table , players bargain together with perfect 
communication. When negotia디on starts , each one bargains for a 
larger share , each tries to convince the proposed partners that he 
can get more by going alone. or he has other better alternatives 
than to sign the contract on the proposed division. If they come to 
an agreement , it must be essentially a stable outcome in the sen딩e 
that the constituent members w:lll have no further incentives Lo 
deviate , unilaterally or as a subgroup. In game theory language. the 
proposed allocation must be in the ‘core. ’3 An efficient allocation 
means that the sum of payoffs under coalition equals the 
maximum attainable industry payoff. One should also insist on a 
“ fair" divísion in the sense that equally efficient firms should get 
equal payoffs. and relatively more effl.cient or strong firms should 
get larger payoffs. In the bargaining process. the disagreement 
payoff of a player is determined by its default payoff that it 1S 
expecting to get by going alone. We call this the disagreement or 
bargaining payoff. Quite naturally. the disagreement payoffs depend 
on the technological positions of the firms. Hence the technological 
asymmetry plays a crucial role in our analysis. We look at the 
core , giving each player its minimum amount guaranteed by the 
core. Then we apply the Nash bargaining solution to the residual. 
that is. we assume that the surplus that comes from coalition , lS 
divided by Nash bargaining. Thus. under this division rule , each 
coalition partner derives its reservaUon payoff plus an equal share 
of the surplus generated by such a coaliUon. The net payoffs of the 
players differ to the extent they have different reservaUon payoffs. 
Given this rule of division. we portray situations when firms fail to 
form a grand merger. 4 
between cross-border mergers and ins i.de-border mergers from the viewpoint 
of 씨Telfare of the 10ca1 country. 
~he core 01' a 당ame consists of those u디Iity (payo fD vectors which arc 
feasible for the entire 앙roup of players and which cannot be blocked by any 
coalition 
4It should be mentioned that for parameter va1ues for which the core 
does not exist , the Nash scheme will obviously not be possible. However ‘ a 
rnerger might be irnpossible under the Nash scheme. and still it mi팅ht be in 
the core 
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existence of a feasible set of solutions for different possible 
coalitions. Our concern is to study how the values of different 
coalitions may be affected by the differences in technologies of the 
firms. and by the nature of product market competition. We define 
a rule for “ fair division." Then we examine whether, under the 
given division rule. firms agree on a gr밍ld coalition. In that sense 
we have a posi디vist’s approach to the problem. Because of the 
extemalities. a firm ’s bargaining payoffs become larger than its 
non-cooperative payoffs when a subgroup forms a coalition. This 
gives some firms an extra edge while bargaining. Then there are 
situations when the group as a whole finds it difficult to sa디sty the 
demand of all firms. This gives some other interes디ng points. 
Sometimes some firms might have more incentives to be outsiders 
rather than insiders. As a result there is a possibility that no 
merger at all will occur. There are also situations when , under 
non-cooperative competition. some firms cannot operate because of 
their technological inefficiency, and if these firms would not exist. 
the other firms could merge to share profits among themselves. but 
the existence of such inefficient firms might prevent the other firms 
to merge. We portray situations under which an inefficient firm 
that cannot survive in a Cournot competi디on ， obtains a positive 
payoff in a grand coalition; this means the efficient firms are to 
pay to the inefficient firm if to form a grand merger. 
Let us briefly explain the source of externality. To illustrate , 
consider linear cost functions with no fixed costs. Then , if merger 
of a subset of firms takes place , it does not matter whether firms 
operate on different plants (but using the same production 
technology) or on a single plant, we can treat the merged firm as a 
single competitor. So , if there are n firms in the industry , and out 
of them s (s<n) firms form a merger, then effectively there are now 
(n-s+ 1) firms in the industry. Therefore , under Coumot compe디­
tion each of (n - s) outsiders will now derive more th밍1 its initial 
non-cooperative payoff. This has negative effect to the profit of the 
merged firm. Because of this (negative) extemali양， a horizontal 
merger of any subset may not be privately profitable. To the extent 
merger of asymmetric firms means that some inefficient firms are 
dropped from opera디on ， one efficient firm ’s payoff also goes up. If 
the degree of asymmetry is large enough , merger of a subgroup of 
firms becomes profitable. 5 
The organization of the paper is the following. The second section 
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firms becomes profitable. 5 
The organization of the paper is the following. The second section 
describes the structure of the mode l. The third section provides the 
formation of mergers under all possible assump디ons regarding 
techn이ogy asymmetry. The last section is a conclusion. 
11. Model 
Consider an industηr for a homogeneous good , 、~rith three firms 
in the industry , 1. 2 , and 3. Their production technologies are 
represented by constant marginal costs of production , C] , C2 and C~ ， 
respectively. Without loss of 당enerality ， assume 0 드 c] 드 C2 드 C:J. 
Product market is characterised by Cournot compe디tion. 
Let the non-cooperative payoff under Cournot competition of the 
ith firm be πt If firms i 밍ld J merge together , the merged firm ’S 
payoff is denoted by 껴， and the outsider k ’s payoκ is 샤. 1t is 
always assumed that the merged firm uses the technology which 
corresponds to the lowest margin떠 cost available to its constituents. 6 
We assume that a bilateral merger will arise only if 5uch a 
merger is privately profitable to its members. A bilateral merger 
between i and J is profitable if and only if 
πqI> πlN+ πjN γ i， J= 1,2 ,3: i~J’. (1 ) 
Thus π않 is defined only when condition (1) holds. 7 
Industry profit is maximized when 려1 firms merge together. We 
call this a grand merger or grand coalition (a Pareto optimal 
situation). We denote this by G. The indusσy profit under G is the 
5In case of price compe디tion under homogeneous goods , only the efficient 
firm suπives ， and it does not depend on how many inefficient firms are in 
the industry. Hence under price compe디tion ， there is no such extemality of 
merger as in the case of Coumot competition. This means that when the 
product market competition is given by Bertrand competi디on ， firms can 
always form a grand merger. The possibility of merger under price 
competition with differentiated products is examined in Deneckere and 
Davidson (1985). 
6If firm i 밍ld firm j merge together, then merged firm ’s technol이잉 
(marginal C05t of production) is cm=min(ci,Cj). If all firms merge toge야ler ， 
then the merged firm has access to the techn이ogy， C1. 
7Suppose Cl<q , Then πg>π;: if and only if a 一 3C， +Cj+Ck>O for i""j’7' k 
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monopoly profit for Cl technology. Let π(ctl 二 πm be the payoff to 
the grand coalition. Our ques디on is: Can we divide π띠 among the 
players in such a way that the allocation is acceptable , and no 
firm will have any further incentive to leave the coalition? Let !기 be 
any allocation to the ith player under G. Then for G to be stable , 
f이lowing conditions must hold: 
Vl +V2+V3= πm 
V;+Vj는 max[ π$， πt+ 끼NJ ; i , j 二 1. 2 ,3; i -,=j 
I πOk if (1) holds 
Vk는 { 




The conditions stated above have easy interpreta디on. The first 
condition is the division of profits under grand coalition. Any 
allocation satis:tying (S 1) is Pareto efficient in the sense that any 
reallocation implies that at least one firm is worse off. We call this 
the ‘Pareto op디maliψ condition. The left hand side of (52) is the 
sum of profits of any two firms , i and j , under G. If (1) is satisfied , 
by forming a bilateral merger among themselves i 입ld j can 
together get π~ ， and if bilateral merger is not available , their 
profits will be just the noncooperative profits. Hence the second 
inequality ensures that, given an allocation in G , any two firms 
have no incentives to go for a bilateral merger or to compete 
non -cooperatively. 깐le third condition similarly ensures that 
individually no firm has any incentive to leave the grand coalition 
because under grand coalition firm k gets V k, whereas if it leaves G 
and (1) is satisfied for firms i and j (so that i and j form a bilateral 
merger) , k will get π~ as an outsider, and if (1) is not satisfied for 
i and j (so that the market structure is oligopoly of 머1 three firms). 
k can get just its noncooperative profit, π::. The second and third 
conditions may be called , respectively, ‘group ra디onality' and 
‘ individual rationality’ conditions. Thus the conditions (51) through 
(53) are similar to core. with the excep디on that we have modified 
(52) and (S3) to accommodate externalities , and a bilateral merger 
will occur only when it is profitable. 
Then our problem in the paper is to study whether meaningfully 
we can allocate pie among the players , given their technologies. We 
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show that there are situations where firms cannot agree on a 
division , and hence they fail to form a grand merger. 
Regarding the division of payoffs , we assume fl이lowing two rules 
which appear to us innocuous: 
Identical players 뻐11 get identical payoffs (symmetry property) 
The surplus payoff, over and a.bove the sum of reservation pay • 
offs , which comes from their cooperation , will be divided equally 
among the insiders. 
The first rule calls for a “ fair" division of payoff in the sense that 
identical firms should get identical payoffs. The second rule 
specifies that the surplus created due to coalition will be equally 
divided among the coalition partners. So we are assuming Nash 
bargaining. Given the technological posi디on ， a player's bargaining 
power in the process of nego디ation is determined by its outside 
option. Thereafter firms have equal bargaining power. Let f , be the 
disagreement or reservation payoff of the ith player. and S be the 
surplus under all firms merger. Then following the above rules. the 
allocation to the ith player will be 
Vi=fi+Sj3. i 二 1,2 ,3. (2) 
where 
S= πIn _ 4: fi 
We have to define the reservation payoff or outside op디on of a 
player very carefully; not necessarily these are the non-cooperative 
payoffs. Given that the firms have Cournot conjectures , we define fi 
as 
o N N if πjk- > πj + πk 
(3) 
otherwise 
The reason is the f，이lowing. Consider any allocation under G. Now. 
if any player. i, wants to leave G. how much it can expect to get 
depends on the behavior of the other two players. If the other two 
players , J and k , form a bilateral merger. i gets π? and if J and k 
decide to compete independently. i gets just its non-cooperative 
payoff. 7rt. Hence the definiUon of f; is like that given above 
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Then , (2) and (3) together imply that (51) and (53) are satisfied. 
For stable grand coalition we have to check (52) separately. 
Depending on the technologies of the firms , any of the following 
scenarios is possible: (1) Cl 二 C2=C3 ， (2) Cl =C2<C3 , (3) Cl <C2二 C3 ， 밍ld 
(4) Cl < C2 < C3. In our an려ysis we assume that the market demand 
is linear.B The demand function in inverse form is given by: 
P=a- 4:qi (4) 
where P is 야le product price and qi is the demand for the ith firm ’S 
output. 
111. The Structure of Merger 
In this section we discuss the possibili양 of formation of a grand 
merger and the corresponding allocations for the players under all 
possible assumptions regarding technology asymmetry. given the 
allocation rules stated in the previous section. Quite naturally. it 
depends on the incentives of firms to form subgroup coalitions. As 
we shall show. the structure of bilateral mergers depends on the 
technological asymmetries of the players. lt is possible to have no 
bilateral merger. merger between only the efficient firms , merger 
between one efficient firm 밍ld one inefficient firm , or merger 
between the inefficient firms. The possibility of subgroup mergers 
creates externalities under quantity compe디디on ， and the outsider's 
bargaining payoff goes up. Then there are situations when the 
grand coalition cannot meet the demand of all firms. and hence a 
stable grand coalition may not be formed. 
A Assumption 1: Cl =C2 =C3 
This is the bench mark case. We have all firms identical. Let Ci= 
C 이. Then. given (4). it is easy to get πm=(a 一 d/4. π~=(a-d/l6 ， 
껴E=(a-c)2/9. 
8In section III.D (scenario 4) we have in fact considered general demand 
functioll. 
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Lemma 1: Under assumption 1. bilateral merger is never profitable. 
Proof: Condition (1) is never satis1ìed , given Cournot conjectures. 
Q.E.D. 
Here \vith Cournot competition , the outsider necessarily gains. 
Since there is no efficiency gain under merger , the concentration 
effect is dominated by the negative externality, making the bilateral 
merger privately unprofitable. Hence , by going independently , a 
player cannot expect a payoff (rJ more than its non-cooperative 
payoff. However , the industry monopoly payoff exceeds the sum of 
non-cooperative payoffs. Since all firms are identical, following our 
rules of allocation , each firm will get identical payoffs under grand 
coalition. This is given by Vi= πm/3 이. Hence we have the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1: When all firms have symmetric technologies , the 
grand coali디on can always be forrned , with each firnl's payoff being 
one-third of the industry monopoly payoff. 
B. Assumption 2: c, <C2=C3 는 C 
This is the case where we bave one efficient firrn and two 
identical inefficient firms. Let P11l be the (unrestricted) monopoly 
price for c, technology. Given the demand function (4), we have 
Pm二 (a+c Il j2. Now given c , if Pm드 c ， í. e. , c, 드 ç_ ~(2c-a) ， firm 1 is 
monopoly. There will be no further merger in this case. So assume 
c] >ç_. When all firms survive (i.e. , if c] >ζ) ， the non-coopera디ve 
payoffs are πt=(a--3cl +2C)2 /1 6 and πlN 二 (a → 2c+c Il 2 j9 for j=2 ,3. 
Lemma 2: Given assumption 2 , (i) the bilateral mer당er between the 
inefficient firms (í. e. , between 2 and 3) is never profitable , and (ii) a 
bilateral merger between the efficient firm (1ìrm 1) and one ineflì-
cient firm (i.e. , either 2 or 3) is profitable if and only if c, 므 (ζ ，c(l)， 
where cO =(14c-a)/13 and c<co<c. 
Proof: See9 Appendix A. Q.E. D. 
9Lemrna 2 is drawn from Kabir멍 and Mukherjee (2000) which analyzes ‘ 
in a three-firm framework , an interaction between cooperation decisions at 
the R&D stage and merger decisions at th안 production stage 
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Assumption 2.1: c 1 드 ζ. 
깐lis is the case of monopoly of the efficient firm. implying that 
there will be no further merger. Hence v] = πm and V2 二 0=V3.
Assumption 2.2: CO 드 C] <C. 
ln this case all firms operate under non-coopera디ve situation ‘ 
and there will be no bilateral merger (see Lemma 2낌) ‘ Hence rη π? 
i•=1 ’.2.’.3. Under G. therefore. vi=ri+5/3 where 5= πm← L.: i πlN. 
operate at positive output levels under 
non-cooperative situation. and the bilateral merger between firm 
and firm 2 (or 3) is profitable. but not between firm 2 and 3. 50 if 
firm 1 leaves G. it cannot get more than its non-cooperative payoff; 
therefore. r] = J[ ]N. But if the jth firm (j 二 2.3) leaves G. the re-
maining two firms will form a bilateral merger. instead of competing 
independently. Therefore. as an outsider. the jth firm gets πlo; 
hence. η; πlO; j=2 ,3. 
Then the question is whether paying all firms at their reservation 
payoffs is feasible at all. It will be feasible if and only if 5 二 πm π lN 
2 πF>o. Note that 5 is concave in Cl. with 5=0 at C] 二 ç and c]= 
CO1 三 (82c- 5a) /77>co. Also (dS /dc J) Iι> 0 and (dS/ dc J) Iσμ<0. Hence 
given assumption 2.3. we have 5>0. Now. fì이lowing the rules of 
allocation we have. v] = π (l +5/3 and Vj 二 πlo+S/3; J 二 2.3. We 




Assumption 2.3: ζ <Cl <CO 
In this case all firms 
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stable grand merger is possible with the above allocations. Since 
π F > 찌iO in this case , the efficient 1ìrm is getting the largest payoff 
under G. 1n that sense it is a fair clivision. 11 
Proposition 2: Under assumption 2 , grand merger is always 
formed , and the allocations depencl on the asymmetry of technol 
ogles. 
C. Asswnption 3: ê 三 Cj =C2<C3 
1n this case firm 1 and 2 are equally efficient but firm 3 is 
inefficient. Let us C:3 = c , and cons:ider Cournot compe디tion. Then we 
note that 
크 ε르 (3c 띠 /21ê 드 E 성 πjv二 0;
크 ç'도 (2c-띠 lê 르 C 읍 π￡二 O.
Explanation of the above parameters is quite simple. 1f firm 1 and 
2 each has mc = ê <; C, the inefficient third firm ‘ 띠th MC 二 c. will 
cease to operate under non-cooperative situation , and the market 
structure will be reduced to duopoly of the efficient firms. However. 
the ineffìcient firm will operate at positive output level if it faces a 
single eftìcient firm (the merged firm of the two efficient firms). pro-
vided that the MC of the efficient firm is not too small (i.e. , ê > c). 
Lemma 3: Given assumption 3 , (i) the bilateral merger between 
efficient firms (1 and 2) is profitable if 없ld only if ε < c* , and (ii) a 
bilateral merger between one efficient firm i (i = 1.2) and the 
inefficient firm 3 is profitable if ancl only if êε (C， c**) where c* = (c 
(v'흥- 1)0)/(2 ←、;-2) and c** 二 (15c- 0) /1 4; <;<c* < c<c** <c. 
Proof: See l2 Appendix B. Q.E.D. 
Figure 2 portrays the results of Lemma 3. We have following 
subcases. 
'0,,, 0 Let ι cU, +UJ - π lj". Then we can show that 2 is strictly concave in c ,‘ 
with 2-0 at CI= C;: and at cI= (l 7a十 38c)/55>cO . Hence 2>0 for CI 딛 (ιCO) 
"In fact , πlN 르 71/ for c, 므 CO • but then there wilI be no merger 
12 Lemrna 3 is a당ain drawn from Kabiraj and Mukherjee (200이-
12 
C 
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FIGURE 2 
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POSSIBILI1Y OF BU.ATERAL MERGERS UNDER AsSUMPTION 3 
Assumption 3.1: ê르 ζ. This is the case when firm 3 cannot enter 
under non-coopera디ve competition. and under this situation firm 1 
and 2 merge. So firm 3 has no contribution in merger any way. 
Hence the op디mal merger structure will be the bilateral merger of 
firms 1 없ld 2 only. The corresponding payoffs will be: Vi= πt+1 πm 
← 2πtl/2 for i= 1.2. and firm 3 has zero payoff 
Assumption 3.2: ê 는 c** 
Since ê>c. firm 3 operates at positive output level under 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. But no bilateral merger is profitable 
Hence non-cooperative payoffs remain to be their reservation 
payoffs. This gives a payoff to i under G as Vi = πt+1 πm- L: i πn/3. 
i= 1.2.3. 
Assumption 3.3: c* 드 6 드 ε. 
This case has an interes디ng feature. Here firm 3 cannot operate 
under non-cooperative competition (i.e .. πf二 0). So it is a duopoly 
of firm 1 and 2. However. if firm 1 and 2 would merge. firm 3 
could operate profitably. But given ê in that interval. no bilateral 
merger is profitable. Hence again non-cooperative payoffs are their 
reservation payoffs. Then if the grand merger is formed. firm i (i= 
1.2) will get. Vi= πt+[ πm_2π끼13 and V3=[ π미→ 2π끼 13. where πlN 
is the non-coopera디ve duopoly payoff of one efficient firm. 
Note the interesting point. Since firm 3 ’s non -cooperative payoff is 
zero. apparently it seems that firm 3 has no bargaining power. but 
here the technologic외 asymmetry is such that firm 3 can prevent 
the efficient firms to merge together. This gives firm 3 some 
bargaining power and it derives a posi디ve payoff under the grand 
merger. The greater the efficiency of the efficient firms relative to 
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the inefficient firm (i. e. , as ê is closer to c*), the larger the benefits 
the efficient firm derives. Let U5 highlight the result. There are 
situations where an in강]ìcient ηrm that cannot sumive in a 
non-cooperative competition can secure a positive paμo.ff in a grand 
coalition. 
Assumption 3.4: f<ê<c*. 
Here firm 3 ’5 output is zero uncler non-coopera디ve competition , 
but whenever firm 1 없lcl 2 fonn a. merger , firm 3 operates at 
positive profit (since ê>f). Contraηr to the previous case , in this 
interva.l merger between efficient firms (only) is profitable. This 
means , fìrm 3 ’s reserva디on payoff goes up to r3 = π30 >0. Since 
bilateral merger between 1 and 2 is profitable , their reservation 
payoffs are r; 二 π 120/2; i= 1,2. Hence. under grand coalition. each of 
the efficient firms gets a payoff v; 二 π120/2 +8/3 , and firm 3 gels 
V3= π30 +8/3 where 8二 I πm ← πl￡ π30]. 
Note that , compared to the pre씨011S case , now the efficient firms 
have become more efficient, bU1: a part of the profits due to 
efficiency goes to the inefficient firm. The greater efficiency of the 
efficient firms pays partially to the inefficient firm. 
Assumption 3.5: c<ê<c**. 
This is the case when under non-cooperative competi디on all firms 
(including the inefficient firm) make positive profits , but , given the 
interval , a bilateral merger between one efficient firm (i.e .. either 1 
or 2) and the inefficient firm is profitab1e, but merger between the 
efficient fìrms is not profitable. So if a grancl merger is formecl. by 
lea띠ng the coalition firm 3 c밍1I10t expect more than its non-
coopera디ve payoff, (i. e. , r3= π윈). But if the ith firm (i 二 1,2) goes 
out , the jth firm (j = 1.2) and firrn 3 can operate as rnerged firm. 
Hence by going out. firm i gets π;0 ， that is , the ith firm ’s 
reservation payoff is r; = π!0， i 二 1,2. 
Now given the reservation payoffs as stated above , we have to see 
whether paying each firm at least its reservation payoff is feasible 
As before , define 8= πm~2 πlo π밍. Then 8=0 at ê=c**' 뚜 (9c~ a)/8 
and ê=c'''''(9c-5a)/4 , with ε<ε<C**'<c**. Also 8 is concave. with 
(d8/ dê) Ic > 0 밍ld (dS/ dê) 1 c‘ .<0. 꺼lerefore ， given assurnption 3.5 , in 
which case a bilateral merger is profitable between one efficient 
firm ancl the inefficient firm , the grancl coalition (if formecll can pay 
a1 least the reservation payoffs to the players if ancl only if ê단 
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(ε， c**']. In this interval under gr밍ld coalition the optimal allocation 
will be for i 二 1. 2 , V;= π;0+S/3 ， and for firm 3 , V3 二 삽+S/3 ， where 
S is defined above. But in the other subcase (i.e. , c** ’ <ê<c**). all 
firms merger under the rules suggested cannot be formed , because 
with 밍ly allocation {v;} , LVI二 πm at least one firm j (j二 1,2) finds it 
profitable to go out of the grand coalition and get a larger payoff 
than what is allocated. In this case the extemalities are strong 
enough that each firm has much to gain from going out of the 
gr밍ld coalition , but the total profits are not large enough to satisfy 
the demand of each player. Hence grand coalition cannot be 
formed. One may think of the f(이lowing allocation. Since firm 3 
under this case has a reseπa디on payoff π% so suppose U3 二 π￡ 
and V;=[ πm • 71":]/2 for i= 1,2. But this is not acceptable for two 
reasons. First. it violates our second rule of allocation , and 
secondly, even under this allocation, firm i has an incentive to go 
out of the coalition , because [ πm π밑]/2< π;0. While in this case 
bilateral merger is Pareto superior , but without further assump디ons 
and different rules of the games we cannot determine the structure 
of the bilateral merger and also the division of payoffs under 
bilateral merger. 
On the basis of the discussion so far we have made we can write 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: Given the rules of allocation and assumption 3 , 
grand merger can be formed if and only if êE(c** ’ ,c**). 
The intuition of the result is the following. We have already 
discussed that under assumption 3 a bilateral merger is possible 
only between one efficient firm and the inefficient firm. Therefore , 
each efficient firm ’s reservation payoff is larger than its non-
coopera디ve payoff. Under this situation , a grand coalition can be 
formed only if it generates sufficient surplus to meet at least the 
reservation payoff of each firm. Hence , if the efficient firms are 
efficient to a critical degree , a stable grand coalition can be formed. 
D. Assumption 4: Cj <CZ<C3 
We have already defined Pm to be the monopoly price for Cl 
technology. Let Pd be the duopoly price when there are two firms 
with Cj and Cz techn이ogies. For the linear demand function , Pm=(a 
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+c J) /2 and Pd=(a+cl +c2)/3. Also Pd<Pm when C2<P마 When Pm<C2 
(i. e. ‘ Cl > 2C2 - a). firm 1 emerges a잉 monopoly. We ignore this case 
Lemma 4: Given assumption 4 , a bilateral merger between any two 
fìrms may be profitable depending on the techn이ogical asymmetly 
of the firms. 
Proof: Condi디on (1) can hold only 1'or one pair or two pairs , or for 
a11 pairs , depending on the technological asymmetry 0 1' the 
players. 12; Q.E.D. 
This is the most general case in the sense that a11 pre씨ous 
results may be possible under assumption 4. We provide the 
analysis of the remaining section for a general demand function. 
while gi띠ng examples for linear demand (4). lt may be recalled th따 
Pd<P", when C2<Pm. 
Assumption 4.1: Cl <Pm-S; C2<C3. 
lt is monopoly of firm 1. Hence Vl = π까 All other firms are 
get디ng zero payoff. 
Assumption 4.2: Cl <C2<Pd<Prn드 C3. 
It is duopoly of firms 1 and 2 under non-cooperaü.ve competition 
While merger between 1 and 2 is possible. but firm 3 can never 
N enter. Therefore , Vi= πi' +5/2 , i 二 1,2 , where π/' i.s the duopoly 
payoff of firm i and 5 = [ πm εI2 π~l. Firm 3 gets nothing. As for 
example , given the demand function (4). suppose a== 10 ‘ Cl '=2. C2 二
3 , C3 는 6. and our result fo11ows. 
Assumption 4.3: Cl <C2<Pd<C3<Pπ· 
Non-coopera디ve game is a duopoly 0 1' firm 1 and 2. Bilateral 
merger between 1 and 3 or between 2 and 3 wi11 never occur. But 
i1' firm 1 and 2 merge. firm 3 can find entry profitable. Now merger 
between 1 and 2 is privately profitable i1' and only if 
."1 N 
71' 12' > πl •{ π2. (5) 
When (5) does not hold. there will be no bilateral merger. implying 
13See examples in 삼le following ana l.ysis. 
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that firms have non-coopera디ve payoffs as their reservation payoffs 
under grand coalition. Stable grand coalition is always possible 
under this situation. 14 
When (5) holds , we must have r,= πt' + (1 /2)[ πJ- πF- π:f] for 
i= 1,2 , and r3= 싫. Then also note that 5 = [πm_(πl￡+ π￡)l>0. 
Hence the firms agree on a division of payoffs under the grand 
coalition. 
Example 1: Suppose a= 10 , Cl 二 0 ， c2=2 , and 4<C3<5 
Then we must get 













































Hence. 7T l?O> 7T 1N + 7r?N and 7T m > 7r l?O+ 7T '0 , π12- πj π2' π π12 π3 
Assumption 4.4: Cl <C2<C3<Pd<Pm. 
In this case the non-coopera디ve profit of each firm is posi디ve. 
Regarding the structure of the bilateral merger we cannot a p디on 
say 없lything in general. Given the parameters (Cl ,C2 ,C3). let us first 
consider a case where a bilateral merger between any two firms is 
profitable , i. e. , 
0" N N 、/
πij- > πi"+ πJ ' γ l r=J. 
Therefore. r,= π，0. Define 5 = [πm_ 2: 13π?]. Now if 5는 0 ， the 
a l1ocations vi=r,+5/3 wil1 form a stab1e grand coalition if and only 
if (52) is satisfied at the same time ((51) and (53) are necessari1y 
satisfied by construction). The following examp1e describes a 
scenario where grand merger is formed. 
Example 2: Suppose , a二 10. Cl = 1, C2 二 2 ， 없ld c3=3. Then we have , 
πm=20.25 ， π1￡ =l3.4 ， π19=11.1 ， π2￡ =5.4 ， πrv =9 , π밑 =4. πf= 
14.yo show that (5) may not hold. consider the following example: a= 10. 
Cl =0 , c2=05. c3=3.6. Then. πl유 (a+C3)2/9 = 184.96/9 and πF πi'=(a+ 
C2)2/9+(a-2c2)2/9= 19 1.25/9. 
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l.0 , π「二 1 l.1, π￡二 5.4 ， π30 =2.8 ， 5'~0.95. Al1 the re1evant condi-
tions of this case are satisfied. Hence V] = 11 .42 ‘ V2 二05.72 ， v3=3.1 1. 
Note that the stability conditions are a1so satisfied. 
Assuming that pain찌se a11 bilatera1 mergers are profitab1e , the 
grand coalition cannot, however , be formed if 5 르 0 , a1though πIn> 
L: i 7[r In the above examp1e if we rep1ace the v벼ue of C3 by 2+E 
where E is very sma11 but positive , we sha11 get 5<0. Now , given 
that the grand coalition is not profitable , our question is: What will 
be the optima1 structure of bilatera1 merger? It is easy to see 야1at 
merger between i and j wi11 be private1y op디ma1 iJ the fo11owing 
condition ho1ds ,15 that is , 
O. N ______ , 0 N 0 N, 
지 + πk >maxl πik+ ‘7[j ! πjk+ πi J (13) 
Let us now assume that on1y one bilatera1 merger. say between i 
and j , is profitab1e , and no other bilatera1 merger is profitab1e. In 
this case. a stable grand coalition can be formed because 5= πlTl • 
(πijO + 7[:) > O. In this case. therefore. fi= π~+[πf πlN πtl/2. η 二
π-_t+[ πf - π? - πtJ /2. and fk= 샤 are the reseπa디on payoffs of firm 
i. j and k. Under grand merger Vi 二= f, + 5/3 is the payoff for firm i. 
Fina11y. consider that bilateral mergers between i and j and 
between i and k are profitab1e. but not between j and k. In this 
case i cannot get more than its non-cooperative payoff by goíng out 
of the grand coalition. but each of j 없1d k c밍1 get more than its 
non-cooperatíve payoff. So if πln> πiN+ π1o+ π￡， a sable grand 
coalition can be formed with an a l1ocatíon Vi=fi+5/::1 if and on1y if 
at the same time following two conditions h01d: V디i+L~는 π상f and lUn)기γ， 
U따따k단는 π샤￡￡; {0〕tm따herw매ise ’ there wi11 rem따n some incen디ves for a bilatera1 
merger. In our scheme , i has re1atively disadvantage to bargain in a 
sense that its bargaining payoff is stuck up at the non-coopera디ve 
1evel. l6 However. if any of the conditions stated in this case fails to 
h01d. the on1y stab1e outcome will be the bilateral merger. and then 
i has the advantage to choose its partner. SO i wi11 choose j as its 
15Player i wíll prefer player j as its paπner iff 감 +[ 샤 - 감 샤1/2> π!이 
+[πlf- πN π:'1/2 ， and similarly for j. 셰+[쇄← πN 감]/2> 샤+[채 
1[~ - 7[,;'1/2. Condition (6) is derived from these inequalities 
ISUnder the scenario described above we cannot rule out the possibility 
that a relatively efficient finn (say , i) gets. under grand merger. an 
allocation which is smaller than that of a relatively inefficient fjrm (say , j). 
This occurs if πIN< 자o 
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partner if 상 πlo al￡ πkO ; otherwise , partner will be k. In the 
exarnple below, a stable grand coalition is forrned. 
Example: 8uppose , a= 10 , Cl =0 , c2=0.5 , and c3=3.2. Then we 
have , 7r T드 25 ， πl￡듀 19.36 ， π내= 12.25, π2￡듀 9.0. πlN =1 1. 73. π?; 
8.56. π:=0.05 ， π10 = 12.25 , π20 = 9.0. This rneans , bilateral rnergers 
between 1 and 3 , and between 2 and 3 are profitable, but not 
between 1 and 2. In this case , 5= πm 감 션 싶=3.7. Then 
f이lowing our rules of allocation , VI = π?+5/3= 13.48, V2 二 π20+5/3 
= 10.23 , V3= π밍+8/3= l.29. Note that the stability conditions are 
also satisfied. because VI + V3 > πJ and U2+U3> π2￡ 
Frorn the discussion of this section we can write the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 4: Given assurnp디on 4 and the rules of payoff 
allocation. (i) if under noncoopera디ve situation not all firrns survive, 
a stable gr없ld rnerger is always possible , but (ii) if under 
non-cooperative cornpe디디on 머1 firrns survive , whether a stable 
grand rnerger 뼈II occur or not depends on the extent of asyrnmetry 
of the players. In par디cular. given the technological asyrnrnetry. if a 
bilateral rnerger is profitable for only one pair. a stable grand 
merger can always be forrned. 
Let us surnmarize the an려ysis of this section. In a Coumot type 
set-up the monopoly payoffs strictly dorninate oligopoly industrial 
payoffs. Then it rnay be considered that a grand merger should 
always take place if binding agreernents are allowed. But we have 
shown that when the effects of extemalities are large enough 
because of the technological asyrnrnetry, firrns fail to agree on a 
grand rnerger. 
IV. Conclusion 
Merger is a business strategy by which firrns ìn an ìndustry 
consolidate theìr posi디on to share a larger profìt. But the 
negotia디on process for rnerger is not always srnooth enough; ìt 
ìnvolves lots of threats and counter threats , or 0비ections 밍ld 
counter objections of players. By doing this firrns test the 
bargaining strength of the paπners. In this paper we have drawn 
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aUention to the role of techn이0당ical asymmetry in evalua디ng the 
bargaining position of each firm across the negotiation table. 
Although each firm knows that there are larger payoffs to share if 
a grand merger is formed. but often they fail to determine how to 
divide the payoff in a mutually a당reeable way. Since the size of the 
bigger cake is fixed. the gain of one player necessarily implies the 
loss of payoff to that extent to the others. No firm wants to give up 
the gain to others; hence each player tries to prove how important 
is its contribution to a particular coalition and what it can 
otherwise gain without being party to the coalition. This tension 
may lead to disagreement or formation of a coalition of sub-optimal 
Slze. 
ln the process of negotiation. extemalities play a very significant 
role. because firms might gain from the coalition of other fjrms. 1n 
our émalysis externalities ari s.e when the product market 
competition is characterized by Cournot. Hence the nature of 
product market compe디tion is 따so important in the process of 
forming a coalition. Under price competition for homogeneous goods 
a grand coalition is always formed. because price competition 
induces no externalities. 
It is not just techn이ogical asymmetry. but the extent of 
technolo양T asymmetry that is more importan t. The extent of 
techn이0양 asymmetry determines whether a merger of a sub-group 
(in our case. a bilateral merger) is pr떼table. If merger of any 
sub-group is not feasible. bargaining payoffs are just their 
non-cooperative payoffs. and through a Nash bargaining firms can 
divide the total payoff among themselves. The Nash bargaining 
allocation seems appealing. and hence it is assumed that firms wlll 
agree to that division rule. But when the sub-group mergers are 
profitable. some firms' bargainin당 power goes up because of the 
externalities. When the effects of externa1ities are large enough. the 
grand coalition finds it difficult to meet the demand of a11 partners. 
and hence firms fail to agree on a grand merger. 
ln our paper the extent o:f technological asymmeσy al80 
determines the nature of bilateral merger. There are situations 
where a bilater외 merger is possible only between two relatively 
efficient firms. or between two inefficient firms or between one 
efficient l1rm and one inefficient fi.rm. lt 외so determines how many 
bilateral mergers can be feasible. This gives some other interesting 
results. There are cases when the inefficient firm cannot just 
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operate because of its inefficient technolo않T ， but it can prevent the 
formation of a (bilateral) merger between other two relatively 
efficient firms. This gives bargaining power to the inefficient firm 
and it derives a posi디ve payoff when a grand merger is formed. The 
relatively efficient firms are , in a sense , to bribe the inefficient firm 
if a larger payoff is to be shared under grand merger. Even there 
might be situations when the efficient firm has the disadvantage to 
bargain in negotia디on， and it comes up with a lower payoff 
compared to a relatively inefficient firm. 찌Te have considered a 
three-firm structure, because it is the simplest structure to capture 
the role of techn이ogical asymmetry and extern려ity in the process 
of negotiation for merger. 
Finally, we note the fi이lowing. We have discussed situations when 
the gr킹1d merger (of Cournot firms) will not occur because the 
firms fail to make a binding contract. There are , however , 
situations when the outcome of the first round of coalition 
produces duopoly. One may then imagine the second round of 
coalition between the two opera디ng firms. This might lead to a 
monopoly of the industry. In our an떠ysis we have not considered 
the possibility of the second round of coalition. Again , while 
studying the ques디on of gr밍1d coalition we have imposed the 
assumption that the surplus created by a coalition is divided in a 
symmetric Nash Bargaining way. Then it is possible that a 
coalition , which is unstable under this assumption , could be 
perfectly stable under a different division rule. Hence , an extension 
of the present work should be to examine the ques디on of a stable 
grand coalition under alternative division rules. 
Appendix 
Appendix A: ProoJ oJ Lerruna 2 
(i) For bilateral merger to be profitable , (1) must hold. Consider 
the possibility of merger between 2 없1d 3. Given the demand 
function by (4). we have , π2￡ ==(a 2C+C1)2/9 and π?+ π맑= 
(2 /l 6)(a • 2C+C J)2. Hence (1) does not hold. 
(ii) Now consider the possibility of merger between firm 1 and 
firm j , j 二 2 ， 3. Let us define 
SI(C J) = π￠- I πF+ 감] 
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Then. for Cl 드 ç. 51 = O. because π 꺼二= πm πF= πm and πt ~"O: and 
5 1<0 for Cl=C. Also 51 is continuous and concave for Cl>ζ. Hence 
강 cO I5 1 (c t) >0 iff Clε(ç.CO) • 
For the demand function (4). cO =(14c--a) /l3. 
Appendix B: Pro여 0,[ Lemma 3 
(i) Bilateral merger between 1 and 2 wi11 be profitable iff 
5 2 (ê) = π12
0 -[ πiv+ 7rrl>O 
Now if é > C. firm 3 survives under non-cooperative competition. 
Given (4). it is easy to show that S2<() for è>c. 
When 강드 ζ， π30=0~ πl￡= πm i. e.. the merged firm becomes 
N N d d monopoly. and π1-+- π2 π1- -+- π2' (superscript d stands for 
cluopoly). Then gain from merger becomes 
5 2 (ê) = πm_[ πF+ π￡l>0. 
Thus if ε>ε. firms 1 ancl 2 뼈11 never merge. but for ê<ç. they wi11 
always merge. Also for ç<c<c. 52 is monotonica11y decreasing in (~. 
So there exists ê = c* such that 5 2 (è) > 0 여 ê<c*. 
(ii) Consider the possibility of rnerger between firm i (i 二 1.2) and 
firm 3. Define 
5 3 (ê) = πm_[ π?+ π윈l ‘ 
Given (4). S3 has the fo11owing proper디es. S3 is inverted U-shaped 
with S3(ê)=O for ê 르('. and S3(ê)<0 at ê<c. So there exists ê=c** at 
which 5 3(ê) =0 and S3<0 for ê>c**. Hence S3(è)>0 for c<ê<c**. 
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